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FOR RELEASE MONDAY MORNING, JANUARY 24;· 1972
January ~. , 1972

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
THE DISTENDED WAR AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. President:
While the "winding-down" of the war has been in progress,
there has also been a falling off in the negotiating effort to achieve
a cease-fire and complete withdrawal of U. S. forces.

In three years

of "winding-down" the war, 10,000 additional American lives have been
lost in Indochina, over 45,000 additional Americans have been wounded
or maimed.

All the while, there has been talk of negotiations in Paris.

There have not been serious negotiations.
Has it ever been made clear, for example, that the policy of
this nation seeks the complete withdrawal of U.

s.

forces from VietNam

subject only to the condition of a release of the U. S. prisoners of war
and the recoverable missing in action?

Indeed, that is the policy urged

by a preponderant majority in the Senate.
favored by the House.

It is the policy apparently

But it has yet to be set forth clearly as the

policy of this government.
There has been a voluminous exchange of words in Paris during
the past three years.
the finger of blame.

There has been a great deal of mutual pointing of
But negotiations there

ha~e

not been.

In the mean-

time, our combattants and theirs have continued to die in Viet Nam.
too, have count less non-involved men, women and children.

So,

All t he while,

t he tentacles of the war's devastation have reached out of Viet Nam ever
deeper int o Laos and Cambodia.
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What once was one war, winding-down, has now become three
wars sealed into one .

That was the inevitable consequence of the

invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and the military adventure into Laos in
1971.
Since there is now a war distended to include all of Indochina, it is no longer enough to talk of a peace settlement for Viet
Nam.

It is no longer enough to talk of peace only with North Viet Nam.

In that sense, what has transpired in Paris for many months has been a
futile exercise.
If negotiations are to have any chance of succeeding, an
enlargement of the negotiating table is necessary .
to be provided for Laos and Cambodia.
in the negotiations?

Who

Places will have

But how can the latter speak

will t alk for the former?

The Senate may recall that at the conclusion of the second
Geneva settlement, hopes were reposed in the ability of a three - sided
government in Vientiane to insure the unity and neutrality of Laos.
The Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, held the confidence of
various Laotian political fac t ions.

For a decade, the Prince tried

to shape a single government of national unity.
His efforts have been astute and dedicated but they have also
been in doubt from the very beginning .

In the past few years, they have

broken down completely and the second Geneva Accord has come to be i gnored
on all sides .

For a long time, there has not been anyiEal communication
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While the

former has had the support of North Viet Nam, we have poured hundreds
of millions of dollars of military and other aid into Vientiane.

We

have supported the Vientiane government not only with money but with
American planes and paid agents of various nationalities .
I regret to say it, but it seems to me that our help has
been so overwhelming that we may well have compromised Prince Souvanna
Phouma ' s neutral status beyond any expectation of recovery .
be hoped that such is not the case but I fear that it is so.

It is to
The only

prospect for restoring a neutral Laos may now rest in the Royal Capital
at Luang Prabang.

The King of Laos, Sri Savang Va tthana, alone, may

command sufficient trust and respect among the Laotian political factions
which , when combined with the quasi - religious loyalty of his people may
permit him to speak for the entire country with a measure of authority.
The King has stood outside and above the political struggles.
As is traditional, questions of State have been left to the Prime Minister
and the other ministers in Vientiane .

The tradition may be too strong to

be stretched to meet the needs of the present desperate situation.

However,

unless the King is prepared to assume a more direct role of leadership,
it would be my judgment that a peace will not be achieved whereby Laos
can survive as an independent nation.

The active intercession of this

one unifying element is urgent to re-establish rapport among the factions
and for effective Laotian participation in an international settlement
the
of/ Indochinese conflict.
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Now

riven by wa.r, Cambodia. ma.y well see its independence undermined not
only in negotiations but perhaps even by the resumption of historic
encroachments on its territory.

The blunt truth is that the present

government in Phnom Penh is hapless, helpless a.nd hopeless.

Only the

resources of the United States stand directly a.nd indirectly between
the continued survival

err

&f~sudden

demise of that government.

Our policies

of the past two years have placed us in the unenviable position of chief
defender of

Phnom Penh's military-politicians.

In scarcely two years,

this self-assumed role has already cost the people of the United States
hundreds of millions of dollars in arms a.nd other a.id a.nd many addi tional
casualties--dead a.nd wounded--among our military forces in Indochina..
The sooner we remove ourselves f rom this situation the better
for a.ll concerned.

However desirable such a. withdrawal, I do not see,

frankly, much prospect of extricating ourselves until peace is restored
throughout Indochina..

I a.m confident that the Sena. te is prepared to

take a. new look a.t the matter a.t a.ny time but there is no indication
that these sentiments a.re shared in the Executive Branch.

As in Laos,

the best hopes for the restoration of the peace a.nd the preservation of
a.n independent Cambodia. ma.y lie in international negotiations.
At the time it occurred, the coup which overthrew Prince
Norodom Siha.nouk seemed to me a. most regrettable development both from
the point of view of the interest of this nation a.nd that of the

..
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For more than a decade and a half the Prince had

dedicated himself with a single-minded zeal to the preservation of
his country'fs territorial integrity and independence.
and a half he kept the war away from the Khmer people.

For a decade
He established

an oasis of peace and reasonable progress in a war-torn Indochina.
In retrospect, the overthrow of Sihanouk has proven more
than regrettable; it has been a tragedy for the Khmer people and it
has served this naticn's interests not at all.

Moreover, our prompt

support of a successor government of dubious constitutional lineage
with money, arms and American lives has served to compound the original
tragedy.

It has brought us little more than another expensive dependent

government, additional casualties, an enlarged war and increased hostility.
If I may summarize those observations, then, Mr. President,
let me state the following:
1.

In the search for peace, it should be recognized that we

are now engaged in three wars which have merged into one Indochina war.
In the circumstances, the Paris negotiations have lost much of their
relevance.

There is a need to expand these talks to accommodate the

situation which has developed in the wake of the invasions of Laos
and Cambodia.
A change of venue from Paris may also be in order at
this time.

The French government's diplomatic contribution to date

has been exemplary but it may be more useful now, to shwft negotiations
to another location, perhaps, closer to the scene of the conflict.

.

'

l
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2.

The King should be encouraged in every possible way to

take a direct hand in restoring the internal political unity of Laos.
In that fashion it may be possible, via the path of negotiations, to
bring a return to neutrality and a resoration of peace to that war-torn
pitiful land.

3. If there is a source of authentic leadership which might
serve to restore the unity of Cambodia and preserve for that nation a
degree of independence, national integrity and peaceful neutrality, it
is Prince Norodom Sihanouk .

In

my

Judgment there is little hope for a

settlement of the Cambodian wing of the war along those lines without
his active participation.
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